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s1. Introduction 
     In the course of long years, Japanese automobile manufacturers have 
developed a complex system of relationships with their suppliers in Japan. 
There has been a widespread conception, since some time ago, that the nature 
of this system must be one of major factors that have contributed to the 
commercial success of the Japanese automobile industry. However, the precise 
nature of this system began to be uncovered only recently." The first task 
of this paper is to investigate, through an international comparison, which 
elements have been relatively characteristic to the system developed in Japan, 
and at the same time, have constituted vital factors that enabled these 
automobile manufacturers to attain competitive strength in the international 
setting. 
     Things are not, however, invariant over time. To adapt to the changes 
that occurred in recent years in their international environments, Japanese 
automobile manufacturers have set out to restructure their production 
networks. First of all, they either launched on afresh, or significantly 
scaled up, their offshore production. As a result, they have been facing the 
task of building up supply networks for this newly added part of their vehicle 
production activities. A significant portion of the suppliers that come to 
constitute these networks have to be located in the host countries. 
Secondly, the same automobile manufacturers have been facing the task of 
adapting the existent supply networks for their domestic production, partly to 
the recent appreciation of yen against dollars, and partly to the political 
pressures urging them to increase the use of imported parts and materials. 
The second task of this paper is to assess whether and how the vital factors 
that we found in the original Japanese system can be preserved in the emerging 
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global networks. Are they going to be sacrificed as a price for globalization 
of Japanese corporate activities, eroding over time? Or, on the contrary, can 
they be made available in other-countries as well? If Japanese automobile 
manufacturers are earnestly trying to bring forth such vital factors in the 
host countries, what will be the implications of such efforts for the 
suppliers that have their national roots in the host countries, and more 
generally, for manufacturing activities in these countries? What are the 
difficulties that such pursuit has faced? And, finally, are not the 
adjustments that have been currently taking place in Japan working toward 
dissipation of these vital factors in their home land? 
     For both of the tasks to be tackled in this paper, analysis of the 
developments observable in the United States regarding the automobile 
production in North America seems to be both indispensable and illuminative. 
I therefore attempt to analyze the developments in the United States first. 
Then, I turn to look at the situations recently evolving in Japan. 
     The program of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I outline the 
basic characteristics of the system of relationships which U.S. automobile 
manufacturers had developed with their suppliers in North America up to the 
early part of 1980s. This serve to clarify the basic characteristics of the 
system developed in Japan. Then I show how, and in which direction, U.S. 
automobile manufacturers have been trying to change the structure of their 
system in recent years. In Section 3, I step into more detailed aspects of 
the Japanese system, spotlighting those contractual practices and structural 
factors that seem to have especially contributed for the automobile production 
system in Japan to achieve efficiency. In Section 4, I analyze the current 
status of international adjustments. First, I look at the situation in the 
U.S., discussing the problems faced by U.S. manufacturers and Japanese 
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"t
ransplants." Then I turn to the situations in Japan and analyze how the 
relationships which Japanese automobile manufacturers had developed until 
recently with their traditional suppliers in Japan have been affected by 
changes in their international environments. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
     In addition to the results reported in my previous articles, this paper 
is based on a research that I made in the United States in 1986 visiting both 
U.S.-based and Japan-based automobile manufacturers, and several Japan-based 
suppliers. It also reflects the results that I acquired in 1988 through 
visiting Japanese automobile manufacturers. 
     As I did in my previous articles, I mainly focus in this paper on the 
relationships between a given automobile manufacturer, which will be 
interchangeably called as the "core firm," and the firms that supply parts 
and/or components to this core firm. The latter firms will be called as 
"parts suppliers
," or more simply, as "suppliers,",when no fear of confusion 
arises.
2. Basic Characteristics of the U.S. and Japanese Systems of Relationships 
     Before launching on a comparative analysis of the U.S. and Japanese 
systems of manufacturer-supplier relationships, I should note that the time 
period from 1980 to 1983 marks a turning point in the history of the U.S. 
automobile industry. Until this industry was seriously hit by an economic 
downturn in 1980, relatively little attention had been paid by the 
constituents of the industry to the structure of the relationships that 
automobile manufacturers in other countries had developed with their employees 
and suppliers. But, after this crisis, in order to revive the industry, the 
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Big Three, a selected portion of their suppliers, and the UAW all began to 
search suitable ways to restructure the relationships that they had developed 
with each other, initiating earnest research on the structure which 
corresponding relationships have taken in other countries. By 1983, several 
reforms had already been introduced, and a process of restructuring of the 
industry, which is prospected to last for a number of years to come, were 
triggered. As a result, the U.S. automobile industry has been proceeding 
toward sharing more common elements with the Japanese automobile industry, 
than in 1980. 
     It does not seem appropriate, therefore, to stylize the modes of 
relationships to be compared as if they were invariant over time, or as if 
they were entirely country-specific. Nevertheless, it seems to provide a 
useful foothold for our analysis to grasp, at the outset, the differences 
between the U.S. and Japanese systems, that were conspicuously existent in 
1980 and were still more or less observable as of 1986. The following 
comparisons are made to construct such a foothold.2) 
2.1 Relative Number of'Parts Suppliers 
     It has been remarked by several writers that U.S. automobile 
manufacturers have tended to deal with directly far greater number of parts 
suppliers in comparison to Japanese automobile manufacturers.3) Let us begin 
with this issue. 
     To do such comparison, obviously it is necessary to determine the number 
of parts suppliers to each core firm for all of the core firms to be 
compared. But, it is not so easy a task to determine this number securing the 
same basis, which is required for an exact comparison. This is because a 
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simpler term "supplier" is often used and this term includes suppliers of 
non-productive materials, such as stationery and furniture for offices of the 
company, as well as utilities and insurances. Even if we remove this 
category, the rest are not necessarily parts suppliers. Since there are 
suppliers of raw materials, and those of tools, equipment and construction 
services. Further, the degree to which core firms seek recourse to marginal 
suppliers differs by firm, and different figures emerge as "the number" of 
suppliers to a given firm, as we include or remove the number of these 
marginal suppliers. I cite below some figures that I collected, which are not 
elaborate and are shown here only to give a rough picture. 
Number of Suppliers per Company 
     As of 1986, for GM, approximately 5,500 suppliers were supplying about 
80% of the dollar value of the productive materials purchased by this company 
for their vehicle production in North America. Suppliers of basic raw 
materials such as iron and steel, and of tools and plants are not included in 
this number.4) If we include suppliers of tools and plants, basic raw 
materials, non-productive materials, and marginal suppliers, the number of 
suppliers to this company reached 35,000. In the same year, for Ford, there 
were 2,500 "production suppliers", which are suppliers of parts and 
components, for the vehicle production in North America by this company. Of 
these 2,500, the largest 150 firms were supplying over 60% of the dollar value 
of purchased parts and components. Again in 1986, for Chrysler, "production 
suppliers" numbered roughly 2,000. If we include "nonproduction suppliers, 
the number of suppliers could reach 15,000. Of the 2,000 production 
suppliers, 300 firms were supplying 90% of the dollar value purchased. 
                                 5 -
     'Let us look at the Japanese side . The parts suppliers to Toyota form an 
association named Kyohokai, which consists of three regional associations. 
Some suppliers are members of more than one regional associations. If we 
remove double countings of these firms, the number of member firms of Kyohokai 
was 172, as of 1986. Although Toyota sometimes purchases parts and components 
from firms which are not members of Kyohokai, the share of such firms in the 
monetary value of purchased parts and components seemed to be below 10% as of 
1986. The suppliers of tools, equipment, and construction services.to Toyota 
form a separate association named Eihokai, whose members numbered 61, as of 
1986. If we add up the members of the two associations, and remove double 
countings, the sum total was 224 in this year. At the same time, we should 
note that suppliers of basic raw materials such as steel and oil do not 
participate in either Kyohokai or Eihokai. 
     The great majority of the parts suppliers to Nissan form two separate 
associations: Takarakai and Shohokai. Takarakai consists of the subsidiaries 
and related companies of Nissan, and medium and small sized companies which 
heavily depend on Nissan as the major customer of their products. Shohokai 
consists of those well-established parts manufacturers who supply to all major 
car manufacturers. As of 1983, members of Takarakai numbered 109, and those 
of Shohokai numbered 54. In the same year, Nissan bought approximately 55% of 
the monetary value of the purchases parts from members of Takarakai, 35% from 
members of Shohokai, and 10% from non-associated parts manufacturers. 
      For Mazda, as of 1982, there were 106 suppliers of processing services. 
Of these 106, 70 were members of Toyukai (a cooperative union of small sized 
local suppliers to Mazda). Besides, there were 232 parts suppliers, of which 
12 were members of Toyukai, and 174 were constituting Yokokai, a nation-wide 
association of less dependent parts suppliers. If we include suppliers of raw 
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materials and of tools and equipment, including non-associated firms for all 
categories, the total number of suppliers to Mazda were 1, 288 as of 1982. 
     Overall, the figures shown so far seem to warrant the generalization that 
U.S. automobile manufacturers have had a significantly larger number of parts 
suppliers per company in comparison to their Japanese competitors. 
Number of Suppliers per Plant 
     To cast light from a slightly different direction, let-us have a glance 
at the number of suppliers at the level of a typical vehicle assembly plant. 
For GM, as of 1986, this number ranged from 300 in the case of newer plants 
such as Lansing Plant, to 1,200 in the case of some plants that were engaged 
in assembly of relatively larger number of car makes, and the typical number 
was 800. In contrast, for Toyota, its Takaoka Plant, one of typical assembly 
plants in Japan, had only 125 suppliers, as of 1983. The difference stands 
out all the more, if we take note of the following facts. First, a typical 
vehicle assembly plant in the U.S. has a capacity to assemble roughly 20,000 
units per month, but representative plants in Japan such as Takaoka Plant have 
capacity to produce twice as large units. Second, a typical vehicle assembly 
plant in the U.S. has no stamping shops inside, stamped large body panels 
being sent from the metal fabricating plants which belong to the same 
corporation and are located often in places remote from the assembly plant in 
question. On the other hand, a typical Japanese vehicle assembly plant has a 
stamping shop inside to feed large body panels to the adjoining body shops. 
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Factors that Underly the Differences in the Number of Suppliers
     The U.S.-Japan differences seen above in the numbers of suppliers at the 
corporate and plant levels seem to stem from the following factors. 
(1) The difference at the plant level seems to show that U.S. automobile 
manufacturers have tended to, in comparison to their Japanese competitors, 
(1-a) buy a significant portion of the parts that they purchase from outside 
firms in relatively lower stages of assembly; and (1-b) assign, on the 
average, relatively smaller number of part categories to each of the sources. 
(2) The difference at the corporate level seems to show that U.S. automobile 
manufacturers have tended to, in comparison to their Japanese competitors, 
(2-a) keep on the first tier relatively larger number of marginal suppliers, 
which receive orders only intermittently, and (2-b) have relatively larger 
number of local suppliers, which supply only to one single plant or at most to 
a few plants of a given automobile manufacturer. 
     Such reasonings are indeed consonant with the perception that has come to 
be shared widely among the executives and managers who are. responsible for 
purchasing activities of U.S. automobile manufacturers. They have perceived 
that factors such as (1-a), (1-b), (2-a), and (2-b) are problematic and have 
to be reformed. But, why are these factors problematic? And how U.S. 
automobile manufacturers have been trying to reform these structural elements 
of their system? Before tackling these questions, we should look at another 
layer of the system: the basic characteristics of contractual practices that 
have been developed on such a structure.
- 8 -
2.2 Ordering Patterns 
Two Types of Suppliers in the U.S. 
     There seem to have been basically two types of parts suppliers in the 
United States. One consists of those firms which have supplied relatively 
sophisticated components such as transmissions, axles, brakes , radios, and so 
forth, accumulating considerable proprietary technology. They are well-known 
independent firms like Borg-Warner, Bendix, Dana, and TRW, and have been 
supplying to each of major automobile manufacturers. The proportion of such 
firms in the total population of automotive parts suppliers is small. For 
each of the components that belong to this category, two to five firms have 
been competing on a nation-wide scale. The other types of parts suppliers are 
constituted by those firms which have supplied simpler parts with relatively 
less proprietary technology. Such firms are quite large in number and of 
relatively small size, often supplying only on a local basis. 
     The components supplied by the former types of suppliers do not change 
annually. Transmissions typically have a life of eight years, and for various 
engine parts the life is seven to ten years. To manufacture such components 
on a large scale in response to the specifications and/or blueprints issued 
from a given automobile manufacturer, investments in equipment specialized for 
the transaction often become desirable, and such investments require several 
years for amortization. On the other hand, there are a large number of parts 
like grills, trims, small stamped plates, etc., that change annually, or bi-
annually, as the automobile manufacturer exercises small face liftings. These 
parts also require investments in specific dies, injection molds, or other 
toolings that are usable only for the production of particular parts designed 
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for a particular model of vehicle. But, usually the automobile manufacturer 
in question bears the money required for preparation of such specialized 
toolings, holds the title thereof, renting the toolings to the suppliers 
concerned, as long as the transaction of the same item between the parties 
continues. 
Practice in the U.S. 
     According to the differences between the two categories of parts and 
suppliers, different contractual practices have been used at Ford. For those 
kinds of parts that are supplied by our second category of suppliers, the 
standard practice has been to set the duration of the contract as one year 
and, at the same time, confer the purchasing agent an option to extend the 
contract one more year at the end of the first year. Such type of contract 
has covered a great majority of the parts. But, for some portion of the parts 
supplied by the first category of suppliers, long-term contracts have been 
used, if the part in question evidently requires investments in specialized 
equipment. The duration of such contracts have been usually three to five 
years. Further, to guarantee the amortization of such dedicated equipment, a 
special formula has been used to adjust the price of the part according to the 
actual rate of operation of such machines. We should not overlook the fact 
that such kind of arrangements have been existent in the U.S. since before 
1980. 
     But, the dominant tendency in the U.S. before 1980 was to set the formal 
effective period of the contract as one year. Moreover, the dominant policy 
taken at the headquarters of automobile manufacturers, especially of GM, was 
to urge their purchasing agents to conduct a market survey of similar parts 
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every time when the specified one-year period ended and, further, to seek 
approvals at the corporate headquarters if he or she wanted to renew the 
contract. Precisely because of such a policy, in many cases, the contract was 
terminated when its formal effective period expired, even for those parts that 
remain unchanged for several years. In other words, concern to secure the 
cheapest possible price through the mechanism of competitive bidding was given 
the first priority. Building up mutual trust between the parties and pursuing 
cost reduction in a cooperative manner through continual technological 
interactions between the parties would require that the relation between the 
parties not be terminated very easily. Such long term considerations had 
given way to short-term economics until the turning point of 1980-1983 came. 
Practice in Japan 
     In Japan, as reported by Asanuma (1984a, 1984b, 1988), the formal 
effective period of the contract that governs the relationship between the 
parties itself, the standard duration of delivery of a given part, and the 
established interval for price adjustment are all different. Formally, the 
"basic contract
," which determines only broadly the general obligation of both 
parties, is effective only one year. But, it is automatically renewed unless 
either side raises an objection. Let us therefore forget this contract for 
the time being. How long is the delivery of a given part by a specific 
supplier supposed to continue? The answer is: it begins and ends with the 
life of a given model of vehicle. Since major model changes have been 
exercised every four years recently in Japan, the standard duration of 
delivery is four years, and interim price adjustments are made twice a 
year.5) Thus, on the whole, the Japanese system has awarded a longer duration 
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of delivery to each supplier, in comparison to the U.S. system. Further, as I 
elaborate later in this paper, the relation between the parties normally 
continues beyond the life of a given model. Combined with other elements of 
practices, this has significantly contributed to nurture the suppliers' sense 
of commitment and to promote their continual efforts to improve both 
manufacturing processes and the design of the product. 
2.3 Reforms Introduced by U.S. Core Firms 
     For each of the aspects compared between the U.S. and Japanese systems in 
the foregoing two subsections, U.S. automobile manufacturers initiated various 
efforts to reform their traditional structure and practices. 
Toward a Smaller Number of the First Tier Suppliers
     As to the issue of relative number of suppliers, the core firms have 
sought to reduce the number both at the corporate and plant levels-6) 
Obviously, this is not a simple problem of number, but involves various 
processes of restructuring. 
     For instance, until the early part of 1980s, in GM, seats had been 
assembled at the site of each vehicle assembly plant, the company purchasing 
frames, adjustment levers, springs, paddings, and seat-covers from outside 
firms. But, the company changed this practice since then; currently seats are 
being purchased from outside. With this change, the number of suppliers 'in 
the area of seats was drastically reduced. While in the former system, 
typically eight to ten suppliers were respectively supplying each of the items 
enumerated above, they have been replaced by one seat supplier in the current 
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practice. One of the former suppliers has been upgraded to the seat supplier, 
but the rest have become suppliers to this supplier, becoming suppliers on the 
second tier viewed from GM. This exemplifies how U.S. automobile 
manufacturers have been trying to create a "system source," out of a number of 
suppliers of constituent parts of a "system component." 
     Tail-pipes constitute another example of a system component, which is 
made through assembly of a number of constituent parts. Previously in a plant 
of GM, quotations were collected from a number of suppliers for each of such 
constituent parts, for each of the car lines assembled in this plant. But, 
the plant has come to use a fixed supplier for each kind of such parts, while 
the assembly of tail-pipes is still done in the plant. In this case, a shift 
from "multiple-sourcing" to "single sourcing" has occurred. 
Toward Longer and Closer Relations with the Selected Suppliers
     Concerning ordering patterns, the attitude of core firms has changed to 
seek longer relations with their suppliers. While the form of the contracts 
itself remain largely unchanged, the philosophy has been significantly 
changed. For instance, GM has sought to base its relations with suppliers on 
what the officers of the company call "Cradle to Grave Philosophy." This 
means that the company would start from asking a supplier to participate in 
the development of a given part, then entrust the manufacturing of this item 
to this supplier, continuing to order from this firm until the model life of 
the part comes to end. 
     All of these reforms point to the following two targets. 
(1) To have more selected number of suppliers who have stronger technological 
capabilities than heretofore. 
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(2) To change the way to secure reasonable parts prices from the traditional 
mechanisms of competitive bidding and of arms-length bargaining to something 
which is based on systematical pursuit of cost reductions and accompanies 
cooperative relations. 
     Closely related to the target (1) above, a slogan has been repeatedly 
heard from purchasing specialists in U.S. automobile manufacturers. (la) To 
bring forth early involvement of suppliers in development. 
     But, what does this phrase exactly mean? And what kind of achievements 
are observable in the Japanese system regarding such goals as (1), (1a), and 
(2)? These questions are taken up in Section 3. 
3. Characteristics of the Japanese System in More Detail 
     In this section, I start from a discussion on the meaning of "early 
involvement of suppliers in development." This serves to illuminate a 
characteristic of the Japanese system, which has not been noticed in the 
traditional literature on the Japanese subcontracting system (shitaukesei). 
Then I proceed stepwise to spotlight several aspects of the Japanese system 
which have relevance for the tasks of this paper. 
3.1 Early Involvement of Suppliers in Development 
     To determine the exact meaning of the phrase like (la) given at the end 
of Section 2, we have to study the time structure of the development process 
of a new model of vehicle. Figure 1 shows, based on my interview studies, 
major steps in the development schedule for the case of Japanese automobile 
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manufacturers, plotting the typical timing of each of the steps along the time 
scale. 
     As I remark earlier, the current practice in Japan is to make major model 
changes at four-years interval, in the case of passenger cars. The concept 
study for the next model starts right after the start-up of the commercial 
production of the present model (the point T1 in Figure 1), 48 months prior to 
the target date of the start-up of the commercial production of the next 
model. But, this concept study is done only as a work of a tiny staff group 
responsible for the product planning of this particular model. The 
development stage as a full-scale organizational work starts typically 36 
months prior to the target date (T2 in Figure 2). By the time point T3, which 
is roughly 24 months prior to the target date, determination of the detailed 
specifications for the vehicle, and basic specifications for the parts and 
components thereof, has to be done and draf tings of the blueprints have to get 
started. By the time point T4, the distribution of blueprints of parts or 
components for the first trial car is to be finished, and at T5, which is two 
to three months after T4, the first trial car is to be completed. Depending 
on the capabilities and practices of each automobile manufacturer and the 
nature of the new model, the actual location of T5 on the time scale varies. 
But, on the whole, it comes to some point in the interval between 20 and 16 
I months prior to the target date. The pilot production at the vehicle assembly 
plant begins at some time between 9 and 3 months prior to the target date. 
Then, when the first car runs off the assembly line, the development stage 
ends and the commercial production stage starts up. 
     Now I turn to discuss when suppliers begin to participate. The time 
point at which suppliers begin to be involved in the development process 
differs according to the basic categories of the parts that I introduced in 
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Asanuma (1988) to classify parts and suppliers: "DS (Drawings Supplied) 
Parts." "DA (Drawings Approved) parts," and "marketed-good type parts." Look 
at Table 2 in Asanuma (1988), which is reproduced as Table 1 in this paper for 
the reader's convenience. Subcategories I, II , and III in this table comprise 
DS parts, IV, V, and VI constituting the DA parts category. As the reader can 
see, the "DS parts," "DA parts," and "marketed-goods type parts" categories 
mean respectively "parts manufactured according to the blue-prints provided by 
the core firm," "parts manufactured according to the blue-prints that have 
been made by the supplier, in response to the specifications issued by the 
core firm, and have been approved by the core firm," and "parts offered by 
catalog to every core firm." Since the last of the three categories has no 
relevance in the present issue, I concentrate on the former two hereafter . 
     For DS parts, the involvement of the suppliers can only begin after the 
drafting of the blueprint of the part in question has been completed at the 
engineering division of the automobile manufacturer. Depending on the kind of 
the part, there are differences among various DS parts in the date of the 
completion of drafting. But, roughly we can say that, in terms of Figure 1, 
the involvement of the suppliers of DS parts begins only after the point T4 
has been reached. 
     On the other hand, for DA parts, the involvement can get started when the 
core firm transmits the basic specifications of the parts to the suppliers 
concerned. This is supposed to be done by T3 in Figure 1. For some items, 
the process of development of the part by the supplier may begin by receiving 
only rough concepts from the core firm, right after the point T2. 
     Thus, the phrase "To bring forth early involvement of suppliers in 
development" should mean: "To make a transition from a state , in which 
automobile manufacturers bought parts from outside firms predominantly as DS 
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parts, to another state, in which the automobile manufacturers buy more in the 
form of DA parts." Indeed, according to a purchasing manager of Ford, the 
following kind of change has occurred in the practice of their company. "In 
the past,' the involvement of our suppliers began, depending on the 
complexities of the parts concerned, 6 months to 18 months prior to the target 
date of the start-up of the commercial production. But, at present, for many 
kinds of parts, the involvement starts 2 to 4 years prior to the target 
date." This description of the change clearly endorses my interpretation of 
the phrase. 7) 
     While the stereo-typed view on the Japanese subcontracting system has 
characterized the system as something in which petty and dependent shitauke-
kigyo (subcontractors) abound, U.S. automobile manufacturers have come to hold 
a different picture. Their perception is that Japanese automobile 
manufacturers have procuring a significant portion of the parts and components 
as DA parts, which in turn presupposes as a prerequisite a height of 
technological capabilities accumulated by the suppliers concerned; and that 
this must be one of the major competitive edges that Japanese automobile 
manufacturers can rely upon. 
     This perception seems to be far more realistic than the stereo-typed 
view. For instance, let us look back at the cases of seats and tail-pipes 
cited in Subsection 2.2. Japanese automobile manufacturers do not manufacture 
these items at their in-house plants. Instead, each of the core firms has two 
to three manufacturers for each of these items as their first-tier suppliers, 
keeping longstanding relations with each of them. When a new model of vehicle 
is developed, the core firm has only to present, to whichever supplier 
suitable to be selected in this round, rough specifications of the seat or 
tail-pipe required for the new model, with the target prices of that part. 
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Designing and drafting will be made by the supplier , keeping close contact 
with the core firm's staff. Meanwhile, apart from the involvement in the 
development of a specific model of vehicle, the suppliers , competing with each 
other, continually pursue improvements at their own initiative , collecting 
information from overseas of new materials and fashions, and doing research on 
new. technologies themselves. The engineering division of the core firm can 
save such efforts. The core firm only has to maintain the abilities required 
for evaluation of the proposals from and performances of the suppliers. 
     One of the real characteristics of the Japanese system resides in the 
fact that Japanese core firms have been able to rely upon the suppliers of 
this sort to a greater degree than the core firms in other countries.8) 
3.2 Downward Pressure on Prices and Cooperation of Suppliers 
     Another remarkable characteristic of the Japanese manufacturer-supplier 
relationships is the following aspect: the core firms have pursued , as a 
trend, that prices of the parts be reduced stepwise during the life cycle , and 
such requests have been met by their suppliers through perpetual efforts to 
reduce manufacturing costs. 
     I have mentioned in Subsection 2.2 a business practice in Japan that 
interim price adjustments are made twice a year. Like shunto (the spring 
offensive of labor unions for wage increase) and ichijikin kosho (the 
negotiation for the so-called bonuses), renegotiations on the prices of parts 
are held as a regular semi-annual events. But, it is the purchasing parties 
who take the offensive side at these renegotiations. At each occasion , they 
urge that price reductions be made by a given percentage, on average , and try 
to persuade their suppliers that it would bring forth happier results in the 
                                        - 18 -
long run for both parties. To cite an example, for an automobile 
manufacturer, the target average rate for price reductions was 2% at every 
six-months interval, during several years immediately before September 1985. 
     This may seem rather too demanding, but the fact is that suppliers have, 
on the whole, ended up each time with meeting their core firms' demand put on 
the table for bargaining, and in more or less cooperative manner. Underlying 
this outcome is a vague notion, widely held among Japanese suppliers, that 
they share common fate with their core firms, and that the price reduction is 
a kind of distribution of a fruit produced by cooperation of 'several parties 
concerned; just as they pay dividends to their stockholders, bonuses to their 
employees, taxes to governments and local communities, they think they ought 
to "pay" something to their customers. This notion seems to have been 
sustained by the following mechanism. 
     The starting price of a part is determined during the development stage 
through a negotiation. If we limit attention on the skeleton, the price 
agreed upon can be expressed as: p(o) = (m* + v*) (1 + r*), where m*, v*, r* 
denote the assessed level of material cost, that of processing cost, and that 
of allowed gross margin, respectively. The value of r* is historically given, 
but the margin r(t) that the supplier can actually earn at each time point 
varies with time. In the early phase of the life cycle of the part, r(t) is 
typically lower than r*, since the actual levels of material cost and 
processing cost, m(t) and v(t), are typically higher than m* and v*, 
respectively. In this sense, the supplier has to run with "deficits" for some 
time. But, due to the learning effect, and improvements that the supplier 
makes on the manufacturing process (gorika), m(t) and v(t) decrease as time 
goes by, and will eventually go down below m* and v*. If, the sum of the 
"d
eficits" can be recovered well before the end of the life cycle of the part, 
                                19 -
then, after the time point at which the recovery has been achieved, the 
supplier earns a kind of "surplus." This is the incentive that drives each 
supplier to perpetual efforts to achieve "gorika." And from the total sum of 
this "surplus," they "pay back" some portion to their core firms in the form 
of price reduction. 
     Note that this mechanism works for benefit of both parties, only in the 
case that core firms do not try to suck all of the "surplus." It is a kind of 
know-how required on the part of core firms, that they allow each of their 
suppliers to grow, on the basis of perpetual pursuit of "gorika." 
3.3 Proposals by Suppliers to Improve Parts and Incentives for Such Efforts 
     Besides gorika, there is another route for suppliers to contribute to 
reduce costs to manufacture a vehicle. That is, through making proposals on 
possible modifications of the design or material of a given part. Frequently, 
a considerable reduction of the cost to manufacture the part can be achieved. 
through such modifications, and automobile manufacturers encourage their own 
employees and their suppliers to make this kind of proposals. 
     For convenience, let us call those of such efforts which are made prior , 
to the commercial production stage as VE (value engineering), and those which 
are made during the commercial production stage as VA (value analysis). As 
reported in Asanuma (1984 b), there are incentives for both VA and VE, in the 
contractual practices used by Japanese automobile manufacturers. 
     Suppose that, a supplier has made a proposal, which has proven to be 
effective to reduce the cost to manufacture a given part from 10,000 yen to 
9,000 yen, preserving the performances and basic dimensions of the part 
intact. Then, at the nearest occasion to come for renegotiation, the core 
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  firm would take the following action. First, the firm would give the 
  recognition that, for this part, 10% price reduction has already been made 
  and put it on record. Second, nevertheless, the firm would continue to pay 
  10,000 yen for each unit of the part for some time, making 1,000 yen as a 
  reward for the proposal on improvement. The duration of extra payment 
  differs according to the degree to which the core firm contributed to this 
  proposal. For instance, the duration spans one year, if the proposal is 
  solely based on the supplier's ingenuity; but it becomes a half year, if the 
  core firm contributed half. This is the mechanism which confers the supplier 
  an immediate reward. 
       But, at the same time, the.fact that the supplierr has made such a 
  proposal has another beneficial effect for the supplier, which works in a 
  longer perspective. It will influence the ratings that the core firm makes on 
  this supplier, and as the cumulative ratings that this supplier receives from 
  the core firm go up, the supplier will be conferred more favorable and/or 
  challenging tasks. As has been analyzed in Asanuma (1988), this is the path 
  through which the suppliers can upgrade themselves gradually and steadily. 
  3.4 Supplier's Responsibility for Delivery and Quality 
       It has become well-known that Japanese suppliers have shown high 
  reliability in keeping up with the delivery schedule and the quality 
  requirements. Apart from the issue of general moral attitude, this has some 
  backings in economic mechanisms. A mechanism is the contractual provisions on 
  the obiligations of suppliers and possible penalties, provided in the "basic 
  contract." For instance, it is explicitly stated in this contract that the 
  core firm can claim a financial compensation, when the firm incurred a loss 
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owing' to a delay of delivery from the supplier. Likewise, it is stated in the 
contract that the core firm can claim a compensation, if, within a specified 
period after receipt, defective parts are found either in the core firm, or 
after the shipment of the final products to the market. Related to the second 
type provision referred to above, the following fact deserves attention. 
Until recently, it has been a general practice in the U.S. that the core firm 
assumes the sole responsibility for product liability after the final products 
have been shipped out to the market. The supplier's responsibility ends at 
the interface between the supplier and the core firm. In contrast, in Japan, 
the supplier's responsibility extends into the final consumer's market. If a 
defective part is found there, the supplier should bear the costs required for 
recalling of the cars from the market and for the change of the parts. 
     This is just the other side of the same coin that a large number of parts 
are bought as DA parts in Japan, whereas in the U.S., most of the parts have 
been bought as DS parts. If the core firm provides the blue-prints, 
specifying materials, manufacturing methods, and ways to test, as U.S. 
automobile manufacturers frequently do, then it is very natural that the core 
firm is required to assume full responsibility for product liability. As the 
suppliers come to take more and more active roles in the development, 
inevitably they are to take more responsibility, and generally, more risks. 
3.5 Longstanding Relations with Ratings and Competition 
      However, to promote "consummate" cooperation, as opposed to "perfunctory" 
one, in the language of Williamson (1975),9) providing such contractual 
provisions as we have seen above would not be enough by itself. Some 
mechanism which resembles to internal promotion of employees seems to be 
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important. As I have already touched upon in Subsection 3.3 with regard to 
the longer term incentives for VE and VA efforts, the core firms continually 
exercise ratings on their suppliers, and cumulative ratings that a supplier 
receives from its core firm have influences on the prospect of the upgrading 
of this supplier in the total supply network of this core firm, and, 
sometimes, in the similar network of other core firms as well. For the detail 
of this mechanism, the reader is referred to Asanuma (1988). 
     Relating to this mechanism, we should note the important role that the 
so-called "two-vendor policy" has played in the Japanese manufacturing 
systems. As I touched upon in Subsection 3.1, regarding purchasing of seats 
and tail-pipes, Japanese automobile manufacturers have always tried to create 
plural -- typically two to three, but at times five to six -- sources, 
sometimes including their own in-house plants, for any items as far as 
possible. This seems to be a little different from "multiple-sourcing" which 
U.S. automobile manufacturers have been accustomed to, in that the core firms 
care to develop close, longstanding, and cooperative relations with each of 
the sources, rather than concentrate on the working of competitive bidding. 
Nevertheless, through "two-vendor policy," Japanese core firms have 
successfully let their suppliers compete and emulate each other. 
     As I remarked earlier, Japanese core firms confer a stable status to a 
supplier, as long as the model life of a vehicle continues, once the supplier 
has been selected as the source of a particular part for that model. But, it 
is not guaranteed that this supplier can receive the order for the same kind 
of part, for the next model of the same car make. At every point when the 
development process starts for a new model, competition among the suppliers 
who have capabilities to supply the same kinds of parts comes to the fore. 
     Just as the same rank employees compete each other for faster promotion 
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inside the corporate organization, the suppliers of the same kinds of parts 
compete each other in the same network. And to give a fresh stimulus to the 
incumbent suppliers, Japanese core firms at some junctures admit new members 
to their supply networks, if only after a careful process of screening and 
testing. 
     This kind of competitive mechanism has been grossly overlooked in the 
traditional literature on keiretsu, family-like corporate groupings. 
3.6 Flexible Production System 
     Finally, I should note that Japanese automobile manufacturers have 
sought, as a basic philosophy, and achieved to a considerable degree, a system 
which might be termed "flexible production system." Below I set out a brief 
explanation of the system. 
     At the outset, we have to recognize the degree of multitude of the 
variations of the final product that a typical contemporary automobile 
manufacturer offers to the public. If we look only at the level of different 
car makes such as Crown, Cedric, Corona, and Bluebird, the range of the choice 
offered by each firm is typically not so surprisingly wide. Even the largest 
companies offer 10 to 20 car makes. And if we do not go beyond this level, 
automobile production remains to appear a typical mass production symbolized 
by the conventional notions of moving assembly line and repetitive, monotone 
works. But, within each car make, automobile manufacturers have come to offer 
an increasingly large number of variations, based on different combinations of 
body types, engine types, transmission types, degree of luxury, optional 
parts, and colors. For instance, while the number of variations of Crown that 
Toyota was able to offer was 322 as of April 1966, it became 101,088 as of 
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April 1978. In all probability, such proliferation of variations itself may 
be traced back to practices in the U.S., as its historical origin. But, what 
Japanese automobile manufacturers have pursued to add is building up of an 
elaborate system of information processing and production control, which would 
enable them to manufacture a specific variation of the car make after the 
order was put in by the dealer, and deliver that car to the user who ordered 
this particular car within the shortest possible waiting time. 
     Of course, at least some part of the production process of that car has 
to be initiated prior to the receipt of the final order by the automobile 
manufacturer. Thus the basic monthly production plan has to be set prior to 
the beginning of the month, fixing the monthly volume of each of the major 
patterns of variation determined by combinations of body, engine, 
transmission, and luxury types. This monthly plan provides a major framework 
for the monthly operation of the whole system comprised of the dealers, the 
core firm, and the suppliers. What the system can offer as flexibility is a 
possibility that it can allow details of an order, that is, choices of 
optional parts and colors, to be filled in at a later date. Let us denote 
by x the allowable time lag between the deadline for the entry of such 
detailed part of an order and the planned date of assembly of the vehicle 
corresponding to this order. Further, let us denote by y the time necessary 
for the delivery of this vehicle to the user. The smaller the value of x + y, 
the system can be said to be more flexible. In comparison to their U.S. 
competitors, Japanese automobile manufacturers have achieved a production 
system with significantly smaller values of x + y, and more specifically of 
x. Among Japanese firms, Toyota seems to have been the top runner in achiving 
such a system. 
     To achieve a flexible production system, two factors seem to be 
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especially important. First, the core firm should prepare monthly production 
plans with sufficient carefulness, and should not change the plans 
drastically. This is because those plans provide the suppliers and the in-
house plants basic signals according to which they determine the range of 
possible changes that might arise subsequently and prepare their activities. 
Only on the condition that such frames are kept stable, quick fine adaptations 
at later time points become possible. Second, the suppliers and plants have 
to accumulate ability to make quick responses to incoming later signals for 
fine tunings. Quick die-changes and practices accumulated with the kanban 
system became powerful components of such ability. 10) 
4. Current Status of International Adjustments 
     In this section, I first discuss the situations observable in the United 
States. Then I turn to the situations surrounding the core firms and their 
suppliers in Japan. 
4.1 Situations in the U.S. 
     In Section 2, I noted two main changes that U.S. automobile manufacturing 
firms have been bringing into their supply networks since the period of 1980-
1983. They are: (a) reduction of the number of the first-tier suppliers; and 
(b) change of the relations with those suppliers who survived the screening 
into longer and closer ones. At the end of Section 2, I listed two targets 
that these changes seemed to point to. To recapitulate, they are: (1) to have 
their first-tier suppliers develop stronger technological capabilities, and 
                         26 _
 (2) to change the way to secure reasonable prices into something based on 
 cooperative cost reductions. Looking from such goals, there should be no 
wonder if U.S-. automobile manufacturers seek to restructure their supply 
networks into the direction that the networks come to share all of the 
 properties of the Japanese system listed in Section 3. Indeed, my perception 
 is that they are, and will continue to be, pursuing this direction, as a basic 
 trend. In this sense, several properties of the system of manufacturer-
 supplier relationships that has been developed in Japan will become not 
 particularly Japan-specific phenomena, if only slowly and may involve 
 processes of trial and errors. In the following, I first set out the economic 
 rationale for such development, and then assess the current situations. 
 4.1.1 Economic Rationale for the Transformation of Relationships 
      The fundamental driving. force for such development is the basic trend 
 found in the contemporary industrialized society. To meet with needs and 
 tastes of the consumers, the firms have to prepare ever wider assortments of 
 variations of the goods and services that they offer, and have to deliver a 
 specific one of the variations to a specific user, responsively as orders are 
 put in. Further, probably at increasingly shorter intervals, they have to 
 exercise model changes, or add new product lines. In all of these, the firms 
-have to struggle for creating some elements that serve their needs to 
differentiate their products, and to achieve such purpose effectively, the 
 parts for these products have to become increasingly customized. Thus, both 
 the final products and the components thereof are no more the standardized 
goods of the kind that the neoclassical economic theory presupposes for the 
applicability of its notion of the auction type market. 
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     If the part in question is a standardized good, the "marketed-goods type 
part" in my word, its development can be done solely as the enterprise of its 
supplier, and the purchasing firms can concentrate its concern on prices and 
availability of the volume required for a specified period. For this kind of 
part, the workings of the spot market, the tactic of multiple-sourcing on the 
part of buyers, pursuit of economies of scale on the part of sellers via 
seeking after ever wider market of the same homogeneous good, and the function 
of inventory as buffers, all apply. But, as the parts become increasingly 
customized, and intervals for redevelopment become more frequent, such 
classical devices decrease their applicability. The basic reason is that 
importance of the "relation-specific skill," as defined by Asanuma (1988) , 
comes to the fore. To develop and rely on such kind of skill , development of 
close inter firm relations, with due care to incentives and competitive 
stimuli, becomes indispensable. This is the economic rationale for the 
transformation of inter firm relationships the has occurred in Japan ,ll) and 
are being sought in the United States. 
4.1.2 Assessment of the Current Situation 
Basic Stance of Japan-Based Firms 
     Traditions and business practices in the United States are in many 
respects different from those in Japan. For instance, regarding the issue 
dealt with in Subsection 3.2, the practice in Japan to provide occasions for 
price adjustments twice a year may well be tracable to the deep rooted 
tradition of having vacations and clearances of debts twice a year, at the Bon 
Festival (the Buddhist festival for the dead held in summer) and at the New 
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Year's Day period. And perhaps the post-war inflation made such frequent 
readjustments, of parts prices as well as wages, necessity for survival of the 
parties concerned. In any event, in the United States, intervals for wage and 
price adjustments have been longer. For parts prices, as we have noted, it 
had been one year until recently. For wages, the duration of a typical wage 
agreement had been three years, but it used to contain automatic adjustment 
clauses like COLA, until recently. To cite another example of differences in 
business practices, the price agreed upon for a part is supposed to contain 
freights in Japan, while F.O.B. prices are used in the United' States. 
     For many of such differences, the Japanese "transplants" in the United 
States are ready to adapt to practices established in the host country. 
Further, differences in the geographical conditions make it difficult for them 
to use the exactly same version of the methods for production control that 
they practiced in Japan. For instance, the straightforward application of the 
kanban system may become impossible when the distance between the supplier's 
plant and the core firm's plant has to be long. Again, to such conditions, 
the Japan-based core firms can made adaptations. They can substitute 
telecommunications for the kanban, or "action-plate" in Nissan's language, as 
the physical device to carry the message. 
     But, for philosophy, they seek to reproduce, with necessary 
modifications, as many of the essential properties of the Japanese system as 
possible in the host country. 
     Below, I briefly overview the problems that such attempts by Japan-based 
firms, and similar attempts by U.S. core firms, face in the United States, in 
the order that I discussed characteristics of the Japanese system in Section 
3. 
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Willingness and Ability to Develop Customized Parts
     One common complaint heard from Japanese automobile manufacturers is as 
follows. Many of the U.S. suppliers who seek business with them tend to 
emphasize that they have been already supplying some items to U.S. automobile 
manufacturers and want to sell these items as they are. 
     But, for Japanese core firms, the same window-wipers, for instance, which 
may be quite fitting for some of GM cars, cannot be used for their cars. 
Japanese automobile manufacturers have long years sought to have ever lighter, 
thinner, shorter, and smaller parts for their cars. In addition, each of the 
companies has sought to procure parts customized to their own company needs, 
and, frequently, different between car makes in the same company. From this 
viewpoint, U.S. suppliers are often less ready to undertake development in 
response to the specific needs of a core firm, than Japanese suppliers. We 
shall come back to this point at the end of this subsection. 
Attitude toward Price 
     As I noted in subsection 3.2, Japanese core firms have constantly put 
downward pressures on prices, and their suppliers in Japan have somehow 
managed to meet this requirement. More specifically, Japanese core firms have 
not allowed their suppliers to pass on increases in wage costs to prices. 
They have insisted that the increases in wage costs be absorbed through 
reductions of necessary man-hours, based on gorika ("rationalization", or 
purposive efforts to improve manufacturing processes). 
     In contrast, until recently, suppliers in the United States were allowed 
by. U.S. core firms to pass on increases in wage costs to prices through some 
kind of escalator clauses. U.S. core firms have recently been trying to 
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terminate such practices and begin to ask 
reduction based on systematic efforts to 
take years to reverse the past tendency. 
VE and VA by Suppliers and Incentives for
 their suppliers to achieve price 
reduce costs. But, probably it will
Such Efforts
     Obviously U.S. core firms will be pleased, if there suppliers exercise 
efforts to make VE or VA proposals. But, as of 1986, I found that the precise 
structure of the mechanism through which Japanese core f irms'reward such 
efforts, which have been reported by Asanuma (1984 b) and summarized in 
Subsection 3.3 of this paper, were not known by U.S. automobile manufacturers. 
     For such a gigantic firm like GM, the seer size of the market that the 
company has a potential to offer may have worked as an attractive incentive 
for suppliers. But, if the company launches on hereafter systematic pursuit 
of stepwise price reduction of the kind described in Subsection 3.2, then, the 
company will have to consider adoption of the incentive scheme similar to the 
schemes used by Japanese core firms, which are closely liked with the scheme 
to assess prices. 
On the Notion of the Supplier's Responsibility
     It is an attitude commonly held Japanese automobile manufacturers that 
they demand an organizational commitment of each of their suppliers to achieve 
and keep reliability in delivery and quality. In other words, they demand 
that a coherent understanding of the nature of their supply be made and held 
throughout the entire organization of the supplying firm. 
     They emphasize this point, since in the United States they at times come 
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accross a situation in which the manner of supply or the product policy 
drastically changes with the change of executives or managers concerned. 
     There were some cases in which the suppliers suddenly terminated a 
product-line, and therefore the supply to the core firm, as a consequence of _a 
merger. In contrast, Japanese firms are accustomed to the notion of a 
responsibility to keep relations -- relations both to their customers and 
suppliers. 
     This is one of the cultural gaps that Japanese "transplants" have faced 
in the United States. 
Longstanding Relations with Competitive Stimuli
     As I noted in Section 2, U.S. core firms have turned to seek longer and 
closer relations with their suppliers. It is at times observable that the 
pendulum is swinging into other direction. For instance, sole sourcing is at 
times advocated or rationalized in view of a tendency adopted by U.S. core 
firms toward larger production runs of fewer models. Obviously, several kinds 
of economies of scale would be made available through following such a 
direction. But this may involve a risk to make the whole system less flexible 
and less dynamic in comparison to a system in which "two vendors" compete, and 
small lot productions on the basis of moving assembly lines are systematically 
sought. 
High Volume vs. Small Overhead Cost 
     The philosophy of economies of high volume has been deeply rooted in 
American Society, and in the minds of academics and policy makers of every 
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country. Based on this philosophy, sizable investments in specialized 
equipment are often rationalized, and gigantic global organizations are often 
envied. There is no doubt that, for Japanese firms as well, economies of high 
volume are important. But, after all, the real target to be achieved is the 
least possible unit cost. A simplistic version of the philosophy of economies 
of high volume would dictate that ever growing volume of the same homogeneous 
commodity be pursued, taking the size of overhead costs as given. But, there 
is a possiblility to achieve the same level of unit cost through a systematic 
reduction of overhead costs, holding the size of production volume at a modest 
level. This is the possibility that Toyota and other Japanese firms have 
pursued with zeal. And they had no other choice, since, at least in the 
beginning of 1960's, when motorization in Japan started, they were seriously 
handicapped in the size of the market, in comparison to U.S. automobile 
manufacturers. Thus, quick die changes and systems like the kanban system 
were sought after with extraordinary eagerness. On this basis, at later 
stages, increasing degree of customization of parts and the system what I 
termed Flexible Production System were made possible. 
     As to this aspect, the basic philosophy of Japanese firms is yet to be 
more fully understood by U.S.-based manufacturers and, more generally, to be 
appreciated by academics and policy makers including those of Japan. As has 
been remarked earlier, Japanese firms often meet U.S. suppliers who are not 
prepared to supply parts customized to their needs. This stems from the 
discrepancy between the two philosophies. 
     But another remarkable aspect of the U.S. situation is that, as a 
potential, for most kinds of parts, there is a possibility for core firms to 
secure competitive sources. Based on this condition, I foresee that, in due 
course of time, there will be a considerable number of U.S.-based suppliers, 
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as well as Japan-based suppliers, who are willing to take orders of various 
kinds of customized parts, on similar conditions that Japanese core firms 
employ for their cooperation with their suppliers in Japan.l2) 
4.2 Situations in Japan 
     In Subsection 2.1, for three Japanese automobile manufacturers, I cited 
some figures that relate to the composition of suppliers to each of these 
firms. The figures for Mazda show that, in comparison to Toyota and Nissan, 
this company was relying on, as of 1982, a greater number of suppliers of 
parts and processing services. Further, the same figures reveal that, of 
these suppliers, a significant portion is comprised of small firms, which 
supply elementary processing services, rather than parts, on local basis. In 
contrast, on several occasions I have heard from managers of Toyota that all 
of their suppliers are supposed to supply more or less assembled parts or 
components, not elementary processing services. Further, we can estimate that 
a substantial portion of Toyota's supplier have been supplying parts as DA 
parts. In other words, in terms of an evolutionary analysis, automobile 
manufacturers that are late comers and are on lower echelons of the industry 
still have to operate with supply networks that are in relatively more 
primitive stages of evolution. 
     Well before September 1985, they were already facing the task of 
restructuring their networks in their efforts to catch up the forerunners. 
They were trying to invite more established and capable suppliers to join the 
nation-wide association that they relatively recently organized, and at the 
same time, were urging their traditional suppliers to develop capabilities to 
join development processes of vehicles in earlier stages. Some of their less 
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able suppliers were to be persuaded to leave the first tier to become one of 
the second-tier suppliers. Irrespective of the changes in the foreign 
exchange ratio, these core firms had to tackle these problems. Then, the 
process of drastic uprises of yen against dollars was triggered by the G5 
agreement made in September 1985. What happened to their networks since 
then? I visited a couple of automobile manufacturers of the intermediate rank 
recently, to find answers to this question. 
      Somewhat surprisingly, little changes have occurred in the membership of 
their networks. Especially, for one of the two core firms, an explicit 
assertion was made that all of their local suppliers that were to be 
classified as engaging in the supply of processing services, rather than 
parts, survived the turmoil triggered by the G5 agreement. For another core 
firm also, except only quite a marginal portion of the suppliers , who had to 
be reassigned to the second tier sooner or later, most of the local incumbent 
suppliers survived and were still actively supplying on the first tier . How 
was the survival possible? In Subsection 3.2, we have seen that , in a case of 
a certain Japanese automobile manufacturer , their suppliers were being 
required to make, and were actually making, on the average , 2% price 
reductions at every six-month intervals , based on their efforts to reduce 
costs, during several years immediately before September 1985. In other 
words, if we take a three-year period, they were able to achieve 12% reduction 
of the starting prices already before the G5 agreement. They simply cut 
through the period of crisis that they faced after September 1985, with 
amplifying such efforts to reduce costs. 
     For established and highly capable suppliers like Nippon Denso and 
Mitsubishi Electric, there were little that the core firms had to do to help 
them. These suppliers took care of themselves. For local suppliers of the 
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so-called shitauke-kigyo kind, it has been known that the core firms are used 
to provide technical assistance. After September 1985, the core firms just 
increased the frequency of contacts for such assistance, and at the same time, 
increased the number of personnels sent from the core firm for such recurrent 
visits to the suppliers' plants. Each of these shitauke-kigyo kind suppliers 
made substantial investments in machines for automatization, achieving 
impressive degrees of cost reductions during the period of turmoil. It has 
been reported that, in other industries such as electronics and apparel, 
Japanese core firms have significantly shifted their supply bases to NIES and 
other developing countries. But, in the area of automobile production, such 
kind of drastic reformation of supply networks have not been made, at least by 
the two core firms that I visited. There seem to be two basic reasons for 
this remarkable difference between the industries. One is that, in 
comparison to electronic parts and apparels, automotive parts are relatively 
heavy and hence cannot be economically transported by air. The other is that 
even such processing services and parts that are supplied from shitauke-kigyo 
kind firms require a considerable degree of learning and skill to be handled 
efficiently, keeping up with finely tuned delivery schedules and various other 
requirements imposed by the core firm. The low labor cost advantages 
expectable in developing countries, amplified by the yen appreciation, were 
outweighed by the fear of loss in the above kind efficiency -- possible loss 
in "relational quasi-rent" in the theoretical term used in Asanuma (1988) --
plus the consideration of transportation costs. 
     An additional-factor is that, generally speaking, the automotive parts 
industry in NIES and other developing countries is still underdeveloped, even 
in comparison to the vehicle production in these countries. For instance, 
Korean automobile manufacturers have to import a substantial portion of the 
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parts that they use, especially of key-components, from overseas. Suppliers 
in Korea do not seem to have much room for assigning their capacities to 
export. 13)_ It is anticipated that, only after a period of investments in 
physical capacities and learning, suppliers in NIES and other developing 
countries will gradually gain capabilities to supply parts to Japanese 
automobile manufacturers. At the present stage, the main items imported from 
these countries for the automobile production in Japan are dies, jigs, and 
other toolings. These items seem to constitute the point of initiation for 
suppliers in these countries for the supply to and the learning from Japanese 
automobile manufacturers. 
     What about the import of automotive parts from developed countries? At 
the present stage, the main items being imported to Japan share a common 
characteristic: they are either actually belonging to or very close to 
"marketed-goods type parts" in my language . Aluminium wheel caps, tires, seat 
coverings, electric bulbs and the catalysts used'for abating exhausts are main 
examples. To supply DA parts, it will become necessary for the suppliers to 
have their plants in Japan and to have their R & D personnels engage in 
development of the parts concerned keeping close contacts with the core firms.
5. Concluding Remarks 
     From the arguments made and the findings reported in this paper, we can 
derive several generalizations. Among such possible generalizations, I list 
the following four. 
     (1) In comparison to other industries such as electronics and apparel, 
the automobile industry seems to have the follwoing characteristic. Once a 
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vehicle assembly plant is set up in a country, relatively a greater portion of 
its supply network has to be located in the same country. And the 
geographical locations of the constituent plants and firms of the supply 
network cannot be very easily reshuffled in response to fluctuations of the 
foreign exchange ratios. 
     (2) The more the amount of.relation-specific skill accumulated in the 
supplying firms, the more strongly the assertion made in (1) will become 
applicable. 
     (3) The higher the level of flexibility achieved by the total production 
system, the more strongly the assertion made in (2) will become applicable. 
     (4) To achieve a flexible production system, developing close and 
longstanding relations between the constituent firms of the system, with an 
appropriate degree of competitive stimuli and proper forms of incentives, 
seems to be an indispensable prerequisite. 
     These propositions seem to contain useful implications for industrial 
policies of all countries. 14) 
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                                      Footnotes 
     * Part of research leading to this article was done during my stay at 
Stanford University, Yale University, and the University of Michigan in 1986 
as a Visiting Scholar. The visits to these universities and the field 
research conducted in the United States were supported by grants from the 
Kyoto University 70th Anneversary Memorial Foundation and the Kansai Economic 
Research Center. The field research in Japan was supported by a grant from 
the Japanese Ministry of Education. 
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1) The structure of contractual framework and related practices has been 
studied by Asanuma (1984 a, 1984 b, 1988). Production control and related 
inter firm coordinations, including the coordination through the kanban 
system, has been illuminated by Monden (1983) and Shiomi (1985 a, 1985 b). A 
system of information processing named "order entry system," which relates 
dealers' activities to production control has been investigated by Monden 
(1983) and Okamoto (1985). Functions of the information network spanned by a 
given core firm and its affiliates, which includes the order entry system, has 
been analyzed by Asanuma (1986). 
2) For earlier attemts to analyze the U.S. automobile industry with some 
comparisons to the Japanese automobile industry, see Altshuler et. al. (eds.) 
(1984), Cole and Yakushiji (eds.) (1984), Mori and Yui (1982), and Nishiguchi 
(1988). 
3) See Mori and Yui (1982), and Nishiguchi (1988). The same point is also 
implied by the analyses made at several places in Cole and Yakushiji (eds.) 
(1984). 
4) Mori and Yui (1982) cited the figure of 12,500 and Nishiguchi (1988) cited 
the figure of 12,000 as the number of suppliers of productive materials to 
GM. But, at my interview made in 1986 with high officials in purchasing of 
GM, I was unable to get a confirmation of the figure of 12,500. They remarked 
that this figure seemed to contain the number of suppliers of tools and 
plants. 
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5) Some of the parts used for a model of vehicle change at the minor model 
change, which is made two years after the introduction of the new model to the 
market. There are also some other parts that change at shorter intervals with 
face liftings of the vehicle. But, the general notion held among the parties 
is that the standard duration of delivery is four years. 
6) For instance, the number of the production suppliers to Ford as of 1986, 
cited in Subsection 2.1, has been decreased to 2/3 in comparison to the 
corresponding number in 1979. 
7) The "DA parts" in my word is often called the "black-box" type parts in the 
practices in the U.S. automobile industry. 
8) Based on interviews conducted in 1985 with managers of respective 
companies, Ohta (1985) has reported for four automobile manufacturers the 
following kind of breakdown of the parts purchased from outside firms. Of the 
total value of the parts purchased from outside firms, Nissan bought 90% from 
"suppliers" and 10% from "subcontractors ." The "supplier" in his paper 
corresponds to the "DA supplier" category in my word, and the "subcontractor" 
to my "DS supplier." The similar breakdown ratio was 60:40 for Honda, 67:37 
for Mitsubishi, and 57:43 for Suzuki. See, Ohta (1985), pp. 71-73. 
9) See Chap. 4 on Understanding the Employment Relation. 
10) The information processing side of the "flexible production system" 
described in this section is called as the "order entry system." For further 
details of this system, see Okamoto (1985). Also, see Monden (1983), Shiomi 
                                         - 42 -
(1985 a, 1985 b), and Asanuma (1986) for more details on the topic of this 
subsection. 
11) For manufacturing industies in general, Minato (1987) has posited that the 
turning point for the Japanese manufacturer-supplier relationships was 
1930's. According to him, subcontracting system in Japan had been more or 
less of the spot market type nature up to the former half of 1930's. 
Longstanding relationships started to be formed in 1930's and were reinforced 
during the war time. Focusing on the history of the Japanese automobile 
industry, Ono (1981) also has posited that Japanese automobile manufacturers 
turned to build stable and longstanding relations with a relatively fixed set 
of suppliers since 1936. 
12) Separate from the issue of parts supply, but in closely related areas, 
Japan-based core firms in the U.S. have faced some problems with their 
suppliers. One of the problems that seem to be worth mentioning here is that 
procurement of dies from outside firms in the U.S. needs significantly longer 
lead time and incurs higher costs in comparison to the situation in Japan. 
Another is that rust-proof steel of the kind that Japanese steel firms have 
developed jointly with Japanese automobile manufacturers has not been 
available in the U.S. 
13) For details on these points, see Chushokigyo Kin'yukoko Chosabu (1987). 
14) For other industries including electronics and apparel, more detailed 
studies along the line adopted in this paper seem to be necessary and useful 
for policies. For instance, if we let aside the question of transportation 




I anticipate that the amount of relation-specific skill accumulated in 
degree of flexibility required to the production system would have 
 effects to each industry as those found in the automobile industry.
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